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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
PERRY MCDONALD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 940105-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
in the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, the Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did defendant knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel? 
This court will review the trial court's factual findings supporting a knowing and voluntary 
waiver for clear error, the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Tenney, 
No. 930778-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Mar. 14, 1996). 
2. Is a defendant who waives his right to counsel entitled to the effective assistance 
of standby counsel? 
This issue presents a purely legal question reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This appeal does not require the interpretation of any statutes, rules, or constitutional 
provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, under the name Terry Storman, was charged with two others on 21 
June 1993 with aggravated robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 and 76-3-203.1 
(1992) (R. 14-15). Defendant was bound over after a preliminary hearing at which he was 
represented by William Albright (R. 1). 
Before trial, defendant indicated a desire to represent himself (R. 96). After a colloquy, 
the court permitted defendant to represent himself and assigned Mr. Albright as standby 
counsel (R.98-99). The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated robbery (R. 31). Defendant 
was sentenced to a $10,000 fine and a term of five years to life with no enhancements (R. 
37, 42-43). He timely appealed (R. 34). 
The Supreme Court poured the case over to this Court (R. 513). By order dated 16 
September 1994, this Court remanded pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
"for the limited purpose of entry of findings of fact on appellant's claims that former counsel's 
2 
pre-trial actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held a hearing 
and entered findings of fact (R. 697, 703-08).l 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
The Crime 
On 9 May 1993, at about 20 minutes before midnight, defendant and his companion 
robbed the Arctic Circle restaurant in Clearfield, Utah (R. 129-36). Three employees were 
there at the time (R. 129-31). Defendant was armed with a handgun (R. 133). The robbers 
got less than $300 (R. 140). Defendant thought the 22-year old manager was concealing 
money and said to his companion, "I ought to cap her now for lying" (R. 135). 
Self-Representation Issues 
After the jury was impanelled at trial, the defendant requested to talk to the judge, and 
a discussion was held in chambers (R. 93). Defendant stated: 
I don't feel that I'm being properly counseled or as a lawyer being [sic], you know, 
as far as discussing the matter, because for a fact, number one, he did not get in 
touch with me any time during the week to even discuss or go over things. He 
just, you know, like I come to court now, just to go to trial, then he comes and 
says this and that, but we did not go over no battle plans or any such thing . . . 
My lawyer did not go over any kind of battle plans or get me prepared for this. 
He was going to make me a bargain, which I did not—I didn't want to take it. 
So he did not come and discuss no common battle plans to me. I am not prepared. 
I really think he is not prepared to go on in this case right now. 
1
 Defendant has abandoned the issues that formed the basis of his rule 23B remand. 
2
 Except as otherwise noted, record facts are stated "in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). 
3 
(R. 93-94). The court invited Mr. Albright to respond. He explained, "I take a position 
opposite to that, and that puts me in an awkward situation, because I am here to represent 
him" (R. 94). At the court's prompting, Mr. Albright summarized his trial preparation, 
including at least three personal visits with defendant in the jail and at least eight telephone 
calls with defendant and six with his relatives (R. 94-95). He reviewed with defendant "all 
the evidence," including the preliminary hearing transcript and police reports (R. 95). Mr. 
Albright had full access to the prosecutor's file and had discussed the case three or four 
times with the prosecutor, including hearing the prosecutor's rendition of his trial evidence 
(R. 95-96). 
Defendant complained that "he has been prepared, but he hasn't prepared me" (R. 96). 
In response to the court's questioning, he indicated that he intended to testify on his own 
behalf (id.). The court replied, "Well, then, you have a right to go over that and there is 
plenty of time to do that" (id.). There followed a colloquy concerning defendant's self-
representation: 
MR. McDONALD: Do I have the right to go question, myself, the people 
that he puts on the stand? 
THE COURT: You can act as your own attorney if you want to. 
MR. McDONALD: Okay[.] 
MR. ALBRIGHT: I would be happy to sit there and advise him throughout 
the trial, your Honor, if he prefers to represent himself. 
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THE COURT: Do you prefer to represent yourself? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I will allow you to do that and make your questioning. You 
need to understand, however, that you will be required to abide by the same rules 
of evidence as any attorney would be. Have you been to court before? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: How many times have you been in court before? Have you 
been through a trial? 
MR. McDONALD: I have seen a trial before, yes, I have. 
THE COURT: Have you personally been involved in one? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have you been there when questions were asked and responses 
were given? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You have some knowledge then of the rules of evidence? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you know what's required in that regard? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: You realize that this is a serious case and that the evidence 
that would be presented is going to be critical in this matter? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
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THE COURT: Knowing that, is it still your desire to proceed and act as your 
own attorney? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: How much education have you had, Mr. McDonald? 
MR. McDONALD: I graduated, your Honor. 
THE COURT: From what? 
MR. McDONALD: From high school. 
THE COURT: Have you had any college experience? 
MR. McDONALD: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you read, write and understand the English language? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you appear to be very articulate, is that true? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Well, you have a right to act as your own attorney, but I will 
ask Mr. Albright to be here. 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. I would like for him to be there. 
THE COURT: Would you like him to make your opening argument for you? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. You can proceed and I will ask you to—you may 
ask questions or may ask him to ask them for you, however you feel most 
comfortable. 
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MR. McDONALD: Okay. 
THE COURT: But he will remain there and be there to assist you at any time. 
MR. McDONALD: Okay. 
(R. 96-99). 
Defendant later decided to make his own opening statement (R. 120). His opening 
statement began as follows: 
MR. McDONALD: Good morning. My name is Perry McDonald, and I [am] 
prepare[d] to defend myself on this case, on the aggravated robbery. The evidence 
that the DA gave here is indeed evidence that a robbery had occurred at an Arctic 
Circle, but me and Dwayne Johnson did not have nothing to do with this robbery, 
and I will give you the story as it should be really told and the true story. 
(R. 120). Defendant continued with a detailed but unsworn narration of his version of the 
facts (R. 120-26). 
After the presentation of evidence, Mr. Albright asked to be excused from closing 
arguments to attend a preliminary hearing in another matter, but the court denied his request: 
"I think we need you here, Mr. Albright. The reason for that, there may come up some 
things in the course of the closing argument by the prosecution that Mr. McDonald may 
want some consultation on and I would like you available for that" (R. 462); cf. Br. of Aplt. 
at 18. 
7 
In closing argument, defendant correctly identified his potential sentence as "five to 
life" (R. 480). He also in effect testified that "I did not do this crime, that I—I mean really 
I did not do this crime that is being put upon me" (id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under the totality of circumstances test, the record demonstrates that defendant 
knew of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation when he demanded to represent 
himself. He was informed of the charges against him and had previous experience in court. 
In addition, defendant's own performance at trial showed legal sophistication. 
Defendant's plain error claim that he was denied his right to effective, conflict-free 
standby counsel fails because (1) a defendant waiving right to counsel has no right to standby 
counsel of any sort; and (2) defendant has failed to identify a conflict of interest here. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Defendant's primary claim is that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the trial court. Br. of Aplt. 
at 20. 
Since defendant expressly declined counsel appointed by the trial court, "he has 
the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not so waive this 
8 
right." State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987) {citing Moore v. Michigan, 
355 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1957)). Accord State v. Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 
1986) (per curiam); United States v. Williamson, 806 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir. 1986). 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel implies a right to represent oneself in a 
criminal trial. Faretta v. California, All U.S. 806, 834-36, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541 
(1975), State v. Tenney, No. 930778-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Mar. 14, 1996). 
However, "the exercise of the right of self-representation necessarily constitutes a 
waiver of the right to counsel." State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah App. 1993) 
(opinion of Greenwood, J.), approved on cert, by 862 P.2d. 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993) 
(per curiam); accord Faretta, All U.S. at 835). 
Hence, the trial court has a duty "to determine if this waiver is a voluntary one 
which is knowingly and intelligently made." State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 187 
(Utah 1987). Defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and 
his choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta, All U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. 
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). 
"Ideally, the trial judge should conduct a thorough and comprehensive formal 
inquiry of the defendant on the record to demonstrate that the defendant is aware of the 
nature of the charges, the range of allowable punishments and possible defenses, and is 
9 
fully informed of the risks of proceeding pro se." United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 
1384, 1388 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1106 (1992). Accord Frarnpton, 
12H P.2d at 187 (colloquy on the record is preferred method);3 Tenney, slip op. at 3. 
3
 "As a guide," the Frarnpton court quoted from the Bench Book for United States District 
Court Judges, vol. 1 §§ 1.02-2 to -5 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed. 1986), which provides: 
An accused has a constitutional right to represent himself if he chooses 
to do so. A defendant's waiver of counsel must, however, be knowing and 
voluntary. This means that you must make clear on the record that the defendant 
is fully aware of the hazards that he faces and the disadvantages of 
self-representation. 
When a defendant states that he wishes to represent himself, you should 
therefore ask questions similar to the following: 
(a) Have you ever studied law? 
(b) Have you ever represented yourself or any other defendant in a 
criminal action? 
(c) You realize, do you not, that you are charged with these crimes: 
(Here state the crimes with which the defendant is charged.) 
(d) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of the crime 
charged in Count I, the court. . . could sentence you to as much as years 
in prison and fine you as much as $ ? (Then ask him a similar question with 
respect to each other crime with which he may be charged in the indictment or 
information.) 
(e) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of more than 
one of those crimes this court can order that the sentences be served 
consecutively, that is, one after another? 
(f) You realize, do you not, that if you represent yourself, you are on 
your own? I cannot tell you how you should try your case or even advise you as 
to how to try your case. 
(g) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Evidence? 
(h) You realize, do you not, that the . . . Rules of Evidence govern what 
evidence may or may not be introduced at trial and, in representing yourself, 
you must abide by those rules? 
(i) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
(j) You realize, do you not, that those rules govern the way in which a 
criminal action is tried in . . . court? 
(k) You realize, do you not, that if you decide to take the witness stand, 
(continued...) 
10 
However, "a specific warning on the record of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation is not an absolute necessity in every case if the record shows that the 
defendant had this required knowledge from other sources.n Meyer v. Sargent, 854 
F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1988). Accord Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800F.2d 1057, 
1066 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that Faretta requirements were met without colloquy 
addressing defendant's "understanding of the risks of self-representation"). 
tt[A]bsent such a colloquy . . . [the appellate court] will look at any evidence in 
the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro 
3(...continued) 
you must present your testimony by asking questions of yourself? You cannot 
just take the stand and tell your story. You must proceed question by question 
through your testimony. 
(1) (Then say to the defendant something to this effect): I must advise 
you that in my opinion you would be far better defended by a trained lawyer 
than you can be by yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try to represent 
yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar with court 
procedure. You are not familiar with the Rules of Evidence. I would strongly 
urge you not to try to represent yourself. 
(m) Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are found 
guilty and in light of all the difficulties of representing yourself, is it still your 
desire to represent yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a 
lawyer? 
(n) Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part? 
(o) If the answers to the two preceding questions are in the affirmative, 
you should then say something to the following effect: "I find that the defendant 
has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. I will therefore 
permit him to represent himself." 
(p) You should consider the appointment of standby counsel to assist the 
defendant and to replace him if the court should determine during trial that the 
defendant can no longer be permitted to represent himself. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12. 
11 
se." Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188. "[T]he record must somehow otherwise show that 
the defendant understood the seriousness of the charges and knew the possible 
maximum penalty. The record should also show that the defendant was aware of the 
existence of technical rules and that presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling 
one's story." Id. "The ultimate test is not the trial court's express advice, but rather 
the defendant's understanding." Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1065. 
"In this regard, whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made turns 
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case." Frampton, 737 
P.2d at 188. Accord Willie, 941 F.2d at 1389; Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110, 
1114 (8th Cir. 1988). The court may inquire into the "totality of the circumstances, 
including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant," Williamson, 806 
F.2d at 220; various factors have been considered in addition to those mentioned. 
Education and family. A defendant's educational level and the presence of 
family members may be relevant factors. See Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220 
(considering defendant's education and presence of defendant's parents in upholding 
waiver of counsel). See also United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.), cert, 
denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984). 
Prior legal experience. A defendant may have "had previous contact with the 
criminal justice system sufficient to give him a general knowledge of the dangers and 
12 
disadvantages of self-representation." Meyer, 854 F.2d at 1114-15 (relying in part on 
defendant's reference to "legal technicalities that I do not understand"). In Frampton, 
the supreme court noted that "[t]he value of counsel should have been apparent to 
defendant" based on his prior prosecution for the same offense. 737 P.2d at 189. 
Standby counsel. Similarly, u[t]he fact that the trial court insisted upon 
appointing standby counsel must have imparted to defendant the seriousness of the 
charges pending against him." Id. at 189 n.19. 
Pretrial proceedings. Pretrial proceedings, including arraignment, may be 
relevant to whether a defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. See Willie, 941 
F.2d 1384 (relying in part on arraignment to establish knowing and intelligent waiver 
of right to counsel). 
Representation before trial. "Another factor courts consider in determining 
whether the risks of a pro se defense are understood is whether a defendant is 
represented by counsel before trial." Fitzpatrick 800 F.2d at 1066 (holding that Faretta 
requirements were met in waiver of counsel). 
Conduct at trial. An appellate court may consider whether defendant's "conduct 
at the trial" tended to show "that he had a good knowledge of the criminal justice 
system." Meyer, 854 F.2d at 1115. United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 25 (1st 
Cir.), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984) (noting that defendant "efforts in his own 
13 
behalf were not "wholly incompetent"). Thus, for example, this Court in Tenney 
rested its conclusion that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his 
right to counsel on defendant's statements "on the fourth day of trial" and the fact that 
he "conducted himself ably during t r i a l . . . " Tenney, slip op. at 4-5. 
Here defendant's colloquy was fairly thorough. He was told that he had the right 
to represent himself; that he would "be required to abide by the same rules of evidence 
as any attorney would be"; and that his was a serious case in which critical evidence 
would be presented. The court ascertained that defendant had been personally involved 
in a previous trial; that he had observed the giving of testimony in the question-and-
answer format; that he had a rudimentary knowledge of the rules of evidence; that he 
was a high school graduate; that he was literate and fluent in English; and that he could 
have his standby counsel conduct examination or argument for him (R. 96-99). 
Looking beyond the formal colloquy, many of the circumstantial factors identified 
above were present in this case. From the preliminary hearing and arraignment 
defendant was aware of the charges against him and the penalty he faced (R. 17, 520-
623). In fact, in his opening statement, defendant informed the jury, "this is a five to 
life, okay" (R. 125). Defendant had previous legal experience, having been 
"personally involved" in a prior trial (R. 40). And of course, defendant was 
14 
represented before trial and had standby counsel throughout trial, including during 
closing arguments (R. 360, 462). 
In addition, defendant's trial performance was at times impressive for a layman. 
Consider the following cross-examination of an eyewitnesses: 
O. Okay. Did you give any facial descriptions of the person that took 
your money? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I did. 
Except for other than bony face? 
No, I don't think so. 
Did this person have a beard? 
I didn't say. I couldn't remember. 
Did this person have a mustache? 
I didn't say. 
Did this person have any scars on his face? 
I couldn't tell. 
Did you see the color of this person's eyes? 
No, I didn't. 
Did you see any tattoos or anything? 
No, I didn't. 
Did you see this person have a gun? 
15 
A. I didn't. I don't recall seeing one. 
Q. But yet you still can see that the person was me? 
A. Yes. 
MR. McDONALD: Okay. Thank you. 
(R. 180).4 
Defendant was able to examine his codefendant Dwayne Johnson over objection 
from Johnson's counsel (R. 359-71). Johnson's testimony, if believed, would have 
exonerated both defendants {see R. 365-67). Defendant's stratagem left Johnson's 
attorney in the position of cross-examining his own client (R. 372). 
Defendant's thorough knowledge of police reports and the preliminary hearing 
transcript are apparent from his use of them in opening statement and witness 
examinations {see R. 123-25, 172-74, 424-25). In fact, he forced at least one witness 
to admit that a statement in her police report was "a mistake" (R. 174). 
Near the conclusion of trial, the trial judge said to defendant, "I think you have 
done very well representing yourself. You have asked relevant questions and you have 
done a good job" (R. 462). 
4
 Defendant seems to have adevelop[ed] an instinct for" Cicero's Ninth Commandment: 
"Avoid one question too many." Irving Younger, A Letter in Which Cicero Lays Down the 
Ten Commandments of Cross-Examination, LITIGATION, Winter 1977 at 18. 
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Finally, defendant's waiver was not "a result of coercion or mistreatment of the 
defendant." Fitzpatrick 800 F.2d at 1067. Although at trial defendant complained that 
his attorney was unprepared, on appeal he does not claim that his election to represent 
himself was involuntary in the sense that he was forced to choose between self-
representation and ineffective appointed counsel. Cf. United States v. Bur son, 952 
F.2d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting involuntariness claim on the ground that 
defendant failed to show good cause for dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel), 
cert, denied, 503 U.S. 997 (1992). Indeed, defendant welcomed Mr. Albright to act as 
his standby counsel, stating, "I would like for him to be there" (R. 98). 
In sum, defendant has failed to carry his "burden of showing by a preponderance 
of the evidence" that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right 
to counsel. Frampton, 131 P.2d at 187. The record in this case shows that defendant 
"understood the seriousness of the charges and knew the possible maximum penalty." 
Id. at 188. He "was aware of the existence of technical rules and that presenting a 
defense is not just a matter of telling one's story." Id. The "totality of the 
circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant," 
Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220, confirm that defendant understood "the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation," and that "he [knew] what he [was] doing and his 
choice [was] made with eyes open." Faretta, All U.S. at 835. 
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POINT n 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH EITHER THE RIGHT 
TO EFFECTIVE STANDBY COUNSEL OR THAT HIS STANDBY 
COUNSEL LABORED UNDER AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST 
Defendant claims that his right to self-representation was violated by the 
appointment of standby counsel laboring under an actual conflict of interest. Br. of 
Aplt. at 37. 
Defendant asserts without authority that "the Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation can be violated, per se, by an actual conflict of interest between standby 
counsel and the client." Br. of Aplt. at 39. Defendant claims support for this 
proposition from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). However, 
Strickland neither states nor implies this proposition. Strickland addresses only "the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel." Id. at 691. 
The right to self-representation and the right to effective assistance of counsel are 
converse; "the exercise of the right of self-representation necessarily constitutes a 
wavier of the right to counsel." Bakalov, 849 P.2d at 633 (opinion of Greenwood, J.). 
Accord Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187; Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 950 (11th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Brooks v. Kemp, 762 
F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985). This is so even of a pro se defendant who at times defers 
to standby counsel. Parker v. Norm, 859 F.Supp. 1203, 1227-28 (E.D. Ark. 1994), 
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rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.3d 1178 (8th Cir. 1995), cert, denied, U.S. , 116 
S. Ct. 820 (1996). 
Indeed, although appointment of standby counsel is a preferred practice, it is not 
mandatory. United States v.Padilla, 819 F.2d at 952, 959 (10th Cir. 1987). See also 
Faretta, All U.S. at 834 n. 46 ("Of course, a State may . . . appoint a 'standby 
counsel' to aid the accused . . .") (emphasis added). Since defendant has no right to 
standby counsel, he certainly has no right to effective standby counsel. 
In short, there exists "no constitutional right to effective assistance of standby 
counsel." United States v. Windsor, 981 F.2d 943, 947 (7th Cir. 1992) ("This court 
knows" of no such right). Accordingly, defendant's claim is unsupported in law. 
Moreover, defendant fails to establish that his standby counsel labored under a 
conflict of interest. Defendant points only to his own pretrial statement that he did not 
think Mr. Albright was prepared to go to trial. Br. of Aplt. at 42.5 This remark, even 
if true, would not establish a conflict of interest. An actual conflict of interest, and 
thus a presumption of prejudice, will be found "only if the defendant demonstrates that 
counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'* Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citation 
5
 Defendant later retreated to the position that Mr. Albright "has been prepared, but he 
hasn't prepared me" (R. 96). In fact, defendant appeared to be well prepared to mount his 
defense tha: the crime was committed by someone other than himself. He to put on his 
defense through his codefendant without the risk of taking the stand himself (see R. 369-71). 
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omitted). Defendant has made no such demonstration here. Consequently, his claim is 
unsupported in fact as well as law. There was no error here, plain or otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED 
The State believes that oral argument may aid the decisional process in this case. 
It also recommends publishing an opinion to further define the law of waiver of counsel 
and to make explicit in Utah that a defendant who waives counsel has no right to 
effective assistance of standby counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on I A March 1996. t 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
VOROS, JR 
stant Attorney General 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
would like you to congregate in the one furthest to your 
right so you are away from the general traffic of the 
courthouse. There are restrooms and water fountains there 
and that's where we would like you to congregate when we take 
any recesses and when you return from lunch and those kind of 
things. So we will take a 10-minute recess at this time. 
Those of you who were not selected are free to 
leave at this time or you are welcome to stay. What's going 
to happen is when the jury comes back in 10 minutes, I am 
going to instruct them on some law relative to what their 
responsibility is. Counsel will then make opening statements 
and then we will begin taking evidence in this case. So if 
you want to stay and see how things happen you are welcome to 
do that, but other than that, you are excused at this time. 
Thank you for being here. Court will be in recess. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
(Whereupon these matters were held in chambers.) 
MR. MURPHY: Mr. McDonald has asked to talk to 
you, Judge 
THE COURT: We are in chambers in the matter of 
State of Utah vs. Perrv McDonald. The defendant is present, 
along with Mr. Albright and Carvel Harward from the Davis 
County Attorney's Office. 
Mr. McDonald? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, your Honor. I don't feel 
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that I'm 
know, as 
being properly counseled or as a lawyer being, you 
far as discussing 
number one, he did not get 
the week 
the matter, because for a fact, 
in touch with me any time during 
to even discuss or go over things. He just, you 
know, like I come to court 
comes am 
now, just to go to trial, then he 
j says this and that, but we did 
battle plans or any such thing. 
that he < 
Then, two, the DA brings in < 
jid not prevail doing in my pre!" 
that I am not getting proper counseling. 
go over i 
this. H< 
I didn't 
any kind of battle 
not go over no 
-oats and jackets 
iminary hearing, and 
My lawyer did not 
plans or get me prepared for 
B was going to make me a bargain 
want to take it. 
common battle plans to me. 
think he 
opposite 
because : 
efforts 1 
least thi 
provided 
So he did not 
, which I did not — 
come and discuss no 
I am not prepared. I really 
is not prepared to go on in this case right now. 
THE COURT: Mr. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
to that, and that 
, Albright. 
Your Honor, I 
puts me in an 
I am here to represent him. 
take a position 
awkward situation, 
THE COURT: You need to represent what your 
nave been. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: 
^ee times to visit 
Okay. I have been to the jail at 
him and discuss the case. I 
him with all the police reports 
hearing transcripts, and I have reviewed 
, all preliminary 
all of that material 
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1 with him. I have taken at least eight phone calls collect 
2 from him at my own expense, paid for those phone calls. I 
3 have had at least a half dozen phone calls from relatives. I 
4 have had — and I have been happy to talk to all his 
5 relatives regarding the case, and they have relayed messages 
6 to me from him when they felt that it was appropriate. We 
7 discussed the plea bargain about three or four days 
8 beforehand with a jail visit. He informed me he was going to 
9 take the plea. I talked to him before we went into court and 
10 I sat down and we reviewed all the evidence one more time and 
11 he, at that time, told me he would take the plea. When we 
12 went into court he changed his mind, which is his right, and 
13 decided at that time that he would go to trial. 
14 I am prepared at this time, because of our 
15 previous — my previous jail visits, previously going over 
16 the preliminary hearing transcript and all of the police 
17 reports, which also I did do, I did personally do the 
18 preliminary hearing, so I have seen the evidence. I met with 
19 Mr. Harward numerous times on this. In fact, he has provided 
20 me with full access to his file, which he has had an open 
21 file. I have been to his office at least three times and 
22 reviewed the complete file, and I have had probably three or 
23 four conversations, two of which I have sat down and in Mr. 
24 Harward's office to review the evidence that he would be 
25 presenting. In fact, I think it was two days ago that Mr. 
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Harward and myself reviewed completely his case in chief, and 
I also at that time discussed with him what my plan was of 
the evidence that I would present during the trial and my 
theory of the case. So we have — my relationship with the 
prosecutor's office has been full disclosure and I have been 
prepared on this matter as of last week. 
THE COURT: Mr. McDonald? 
MR. McDONALD: Just like he said, he has been 
prepared, but he hasn't prepared me. I am the one that is 
going to have to go up and do a five to life. 
THE COURT: I don't know what more preparation 
you would make, Mr. McDonald. Are you going to testify? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Well, then, you have a right to go 
over that and there is plenty of time to do that 
MR. McDONALD: Do I have the right to go 
question, myself, the people that he puts on the stand? 
THE COURT: You can act as your own attorney if 
you want to. 
MR. McDONALD: Okay 
MR. ALBRIGHT: I would be happy to sit there and 
advise him throughout the trial, your Honor, if he prefers to 
represent himself. 
THE COURT: Do you prefer to represent yourself? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. 
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1 THE COURT: I will allow you to do that and make 
2 your questioning. You need to understand, however, that you 
3 will be required to abide by the same rules of evidence as 
4 any attorney would be. Have you been to court before? 
5 MR. MCDONALD: Yes. 
6 THE COURT: How many times have you been in court 
7 before? Have you been through a trial? 
8 MR. McDONALD: I have seen a trial before, yes, I 
9 have. 
10 THE COURT: Have you personally been involved in 
11 one? 
12 MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: Have you been there when questions 
14 were asked and responses were given? 
15 MR. McDONALD: Yes, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: You have some knowledge then of the 
17 rules of evidence? 
18 MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. 
19 THE COURT: And you know what's required in that 
20 regard? 
21 MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
22 THE COURT: You realize that this is a serious 
23 case and that the evidence that would be presented is going 
24 to be critical in this matter? 
25 MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
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THE COURT: Knowing that, is it still your desire 
to proceed and act as your own attorney? 
MR. MCDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: How much education have you had, Mr. 
McDonald? 
MR. McDONALD: I graduated, your Honor. 
THE COURT: From what? 
MR. McDONALD: From high school. 
THE COURT: Have you had any college experience? 
MR. McDONALD: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you read, write and understand the 
English language? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you appear to be very articulate, 
is that true? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. 
THE COURT: Well, you have a right to act as 
your own attorney, but I will ask Mr. Albright to be here. 
MR. McDONALD: Yes. I would like for him to be 
there. 
THE COURT: Would you like him to make your 
opening argument for you? 
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. You can proceed and I 
will ask you to — you may ask questions or may ask him to 
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1 ask them for you, however you feel most comfortable. 
2 MR. MCDONALD: Okay. 
3 THE COURT: But he will remain there and be there 
4 to assist you at any time. 
5 MR. MCDONALD: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: Mr. Harward? 
7 1 MR. HARWARD: Yes, your Honor. I am the 
8 prosecutor who approved the filing of this case. I've 
9 considered it an important case since I first became aware of 
10 it. Three people were charged, the two defendants before the 
11 Court today. The third defendant is Cal Johnson. There was 
12 a preliminary hearing at the Circuit Court for Cal Johnson, 
13 and I know in connection with that hearing, Mr. Albright had 
14 a great interest. I shared some information with Mr. 
15 Albright in connection with that hearing. The preliminary 
16 hearing for the defendant now before the Court was set and 
17 continued. Each time I was prepared. Each time I had 
18 contact with Mr. Albright, shared with him information. 
19 One of the complaints Mr. McDonald expressed a 
20 few moments ago is he now is learning of some evidence for 
21 the first time that wasn't presented at the preliminary 
22 hearing. At the preliminary hearing in his case, the State 
23 had marked and had offered several exhibits. Some are the 
24 same exhibits today. But we did introduce all of the 
25 exhibits at the preliminary hearing that we have available 
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today. 
During the course of the investigation of this 
case, the police gathered many items. Mr. Albright has had a 
list and has explained to him all of the evidence. It has 
been brought to the courthouse today and I've selected 19 
different articles that I am going to use for evidence. One 
of the concerns Mr. McDonald has is on a list that I had 
prepared, I have item no. 14, which is identified as a jacket 
with a Raiders on it, and I have in parentheses, "Dwayne was 
wearing." That's an inadvertence on my part. Before we 
came into chambers a few minutes ago, I shared with Mr. 
Albright and Mr. Murphy my inadvertence. We expect the 
evidence will show that Mr. McDonald was wearing that. 
That's consistent with the police reports and the 
information that Mr. Albright has had prior to today. Mr. 
McDonald was concerned that now we are switching evidence 
right at the last moment. That is a typographical 
inadvertence. 
THE COURT: You need to realize, Mr. McDonald, 
what they say evidence is doesn't necessarily mean what it is 
or what conclusion they are going to — the jury is drawing 
from it. They are going to have to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt out there what they say. It makes no difference to me 
or to the jury. They have got to prove it. 
MR. MCDONALD: Okay. 
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1 MR. HARWARD: There is one other thing I want to 
2 say in conclusion. It is true that Mr. Albright, as already 
3 reported, has contacted me several times. I am a person who 
4 talks a lot, and I have shared my personal observation about 
5 the case, the strategy that I intend to follow, and I know 
6 that he was prepared, even before the preliminary hearing, to 
7 meet the State's evidence, and it was a fairly long 
8 preliminary, and I know that he has been diligent in his 
9 efforts in becoming aware of the case, which considered legal 
10 issues in the case, and otherwise has been very active in 
11 working on the matter. 
12 THE COURT: The Court would find that this matter 
13 went to preliminary hearing, and that the defendant was 
14 represented by Mr. Albright at the preliminary hearing. All 
15 evidence has been disclosed through an open door policy at 
16 the County Attorney's Office, and there is no evidence which 
17 is not known to the defendant through his counsel. The Court 
18 would further find that defense counsel has met with the 
19 defendant on numerous occasions, has talked with family 
20 members and all others who have had information in this 
21 matter, and is fully prepared to go to trial today and is 
22 acting as adequate counsel, in fact, probably more than 
23 adequate under the law. 
24 The Court would find that he is present and I 
25 will direct counsel to remain at counsel table with Mr. 
McDonald in the event he wishes to consult with him or have 
him participate in any part of the trial. Mr. McDonald has 
requested that he make the opening statement, and as the 
trial goes along, you can elect whether you want to 
cross-examine or you want Mr. Albright to, Mr. McDonald, but 
you both can't do it on a particular witness. If he starts 
out and there are other questions you want him to ask, you 
are welcome to convey those to him, but I won't let you 
cross-examine and then Mr. Albright cross-examine. See what 
I'm saying? 
MR. McDONALD: I understand, your Honor. 
THE COURT: That's just to cut down stress on 
witnesses, really, and to keep order in the courtroom. 
MR. McDONALD: Okay. 
THE COURT: All right. Are you ready to go? All 
right. Thank you. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Thank you. 
MR. HARWARD: Thank you. 
MR. McDONALD: Thank you. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken.) 
(Whereupon these matters were held in chambers.) 
THE COURT: We are in chambers in the matter of 
State of Utah vs. Dwavne Johnson. The State is present and 
represented by Mr. Harward, and Mr. Johnson is present and 
represented by Mr. Murphy. 
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